题目: Debt Financing, Soft Budget Constraints, and the Chinese Government Ownership 演讲者：  田利辉博士 北京大学光华管理学院金融系 时间:   2006年4月14日（星期五）3：00—4：30 PM     地点:         嘉庚二513 参加者:     对财务研究有兴趣的广大师生 主持人： 屈文洲老师 报告论文摘要: Debt financing is supposed to help improve the quality of corporate governance, but it must count on institutional settings. Using a sample of China’s publicly listed companies, we find that an increase of bank loans increases the size of managerial perks and free cash flows, and that it decreases corporate value in the firms with the government as a large shareholder. If the government owns both the creditors and debtors, bank lending facilitates managerial exploitation of corporate wealth. In contrast, bank lending somehow constrains managerial agency costs in the borrowing firms without significant government shareholding. The failure of corporate governance comes from the institutional arrangement of shared government ownership, which nurtures soft budget constraints. 田利辉教授简介： 田利辉博士先后获北京大学学士学位及伦敦商学院金融和经济学博士学位，曾在密歇根大学做博士后研究，现任教于北京大学光华管理学院金融系。他的主要研究方向为公司财务与金融市场等，并为美国国际金融管理协会学术组织委员会会员，伦敦商学院客座研究员。