题  目：Corporate Disclosure and Revelatory Price Efficiency:The Case of Capital Investment Guidance

报告人：沈江华助理教授
主持人：张国清教授
时   间：2019年10月29日（星期二），15:00-17:30
地    点：嘉庚二208室 

论文摘要：We examine how management capital investment guidance affects revelatory price efficiency (RPE), which refers to the extent to which prices reveal new information for managers to make real decision. Using a difference-in-differences design, we find significantly higher investment-q sensitivity after capital investment guidance initiation. Additional analyses show that this result is driven by managers learning from prices, as opposed to market learning from managers, increased monitoring, or alleviated financial constraints. In contrast, initiating management earnings guidance decreases investment-q sensitivity. Our results are consistent with theoretical predictions in Goldstein and Yang (2019) about implications of different types of disclosures for RPE.