题目: Does Granting Minority Shareholders Direct Control over Corporate Decisions Help Reduce Value Decreasing Corporate Decisions in Firms with Concentrated Share Ownership? A Natural Experiment from China 演讲者：Zhihong Chen, Assistant Professor in Accounting, City University of Hong Kong 时间: 2010年12月3日（星期五）3:00—4:30PM 地点: 嘉庚二501 参加者: 对会计研究有兴趣的广大师生 主持人： 沈哲老师 论文简介： Using a 2004 Chinese securities regulation that requires equity offering proposals to seek the separate approval of minority shareholders, we examine whether giving minority shareholders direct control over corporate decisions helps reduce value decreasing corporate decisions in firms with concentrated share ownership. We find that the  regulation deters management from submitting value decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher  mutual fund ownership but not in firms with higher ownership by either other institutions or individuals. There is also weak evidence that minority shareholders are more likely to veto value decreasing equity offering proposals in firms with higher mutual fund ownership  in the post-regulation period. Overall, our evidence suggests that the effect of granting minority shareholders direct control over corporate decisions  on  the quality of corporate decisions  depends on the composition of minority shareholders. 论文作者简介： Dr. Chen Zhihong’s research interests include Accounting information, disclosure, market effiiciency; Corporate governance and Executive pay; and Cost of capital.